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This article will consider the engagement of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 
determining the application of Article 9(1) European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) freedom of conscience in two leading case decisions: Lee v Ashers Baking 
Company Ltd 20182 and Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan 2014.3 Lady Hale’s 
lead opinions in these cases will be analysed. This will demonstrate important 
developments in both equality law and freedom of conscience. In particular, through 
this examination it will be shown that freedom of conscience under Article 9(1) 
European Convention of Human Rights has been strengthened. 
Introduction  
The cases of Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd 20184 and Greater Glasgow Health 
Board v Doogan 20145 are recent influential equality law cases with lead opinions 
given by Lady Hale. There were no dissenting opinions given in either case. These 
cases have been chosen because they are leading cases focusing upon freedom of 
conscience under Article 9 ECHR. Discussion will first focus on the concept of 
conscience drawing upon the thoughts and views of the psychoanalyst Sigmund 
Freud. The paper will then examine the cases highlighted above. As such, the concept 
of conscience is considered earlier in the article to show how freedom of conscience 
is later strengthened through Lady Hale’s engagement with Article 9.  
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Conscience is an elusive and intangible concept. Discussion of conscience in moral 
philosophy and jurisprudence has become quite rare because conscience is seen to 
be difficult to discuss.6 Despite there being many different theories about what 
conscience actually means and how it is defined,7 I identify that the concept of 
conscience is explicitly connected with belief and non-belief. For instance, conscience 
is frequently engaged in contemporary human rights discourse. There is an 
understanding of conscience and religion set down in Article 9 ECHR: ‘Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion.’ This right is of fundamental importance because 
acting against conscience is prima facie discriminatory, falling within the ambit of 
Articles 9 and 14 (Freedom from Discrimination). 
There is a problem created by considering freedom of conscience only in relation to 
religion. Such an approach creates difficulties assessing a full, developed 
understanding surrounding the concept of conscience. This article does not adopt such 
an approach. Considering only freedom of religious conscience invites criticism for two 
reasons. First, this approach can be criticised because it portrays a ‘limiting 
individualistic tendency’.8 The tendency in this complaint comes about by regarding 
freedom of conscience as primarily a matter of religious liberty and vice versa.9 The 
concept of conscience is limited to the individual exercising religion in the state, such 
an individual being allowed to attend Friday prayers within a Muslim country and so 
does not consider the role of the wider religious body. It does not consider collective 
rights. In considering solely freedom of religious conscience the role played by 
collective religious conscience can be ignored by the state in favour of the individual. 
Second, considering freedom of religious conscience does not further clearly 
acknowledge that every individual of sound mind has a developed conscience 
impacting upon both their objective and subjective decisions.10 References to freedom 
of religious conscience, for example, ignore the fact that conscience is not only a 
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religious concept.11 Conscience is a subtle concept – freedom of conscience is not 
only confined to religion and is open to wider influences.  
For instance, it has been argued by Hudson that there is an objective sense of 
conscience. An ‘objectively constituted conscience’12 was recognised by the Roman 
Catholic theologian Cardinal Newman as acknowledging that Roman Catholics receive 
religious teaching given plentifully to them, which then impacts their attitudes and holds 
them to account throughout life.13 The basis for freedom of conscience can be seen in 
a concern for human flourishing: ‘[Cardinal Newman] locates the foundation of 
honourable freedoms in a concern for human excellence and human flourishing.’14 It 
is clear that when talking about conscience, Cardinal Newman states that ‘conscience 
is…a stern monitor.’15 Therefore, conscience is a guiding force, like a pair of braces 
straightening an individual’s teeth. Although this understanding of conscience can 
govern religion, it is not reliant upon considering freedom of conscience solely relating 
to freedom of religious conscience.  
The legal philosopher Robert George has contrasted this ‘objective conscience’ with a 
subjective, autonomous notion of conscience which is termed ‘conscience as “self-will” 
[which] is a matter of feeling or emotion’.16 Here conscience is relegated to feelings 
and emotions. This contrast is useful because it highlights different approaches that 
have been taken towards the concept of conscience. 
It is also evident that outside, external influences can further impact on the conscience. 
For example, individual obligation can particularly impact conscience. This is because 
conscience is ‘a right to do what one judges oneself to be under an obligation to do, 
whether one welcomes the obligation or must overcome strong aversion to fulfil it.’17 
Obligation is a powerful motivating force. To elaborate on this, as George points out, it 
is why individuals compelled by their religious teaching may be forced to carry out 
duties or follow mandated teachings even if they do not want to follow them.18 Religious 
liberty can involve demands put upon followers that may require them to abstain from 
or follow certain actions, sometimes even against their own will. External influences 
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can further extend to educational influences and also influence brought about by an 
individual’s peer group. Freedom of conscience is not solely dependent upon a 
subjective notion of conscience. This allows for outside, wider influence. 
2 Freud and conscience 
This line of thought can be developed by engaging with the work of the psychoanalyst 
Sigmund Freud. It has been suggested by Hudson that there is an objective 
psychological sense of conscience.19 This flows from a mixture of objective ideas 
implanted into the mind.20 Such an understanding of conscience as an objectively 
formed phenomenon derives from Freud’s work in psychoanalysis. Freud sets out the 
relationship between the super-ego and conscience in The Question of Lay Analysis: 
‘you will already have guessed that that the super-ego is the vehicle of the 
phenomenon that we call conscience.’21 Building upon the interrelation between the 
id/ego/super-ego,22 his psychoanalysis of the mind led to Freud coming to detail the 
creation of conscience as a psychological phenomenon.23 A strict role for the 
conscience is given that limits individual subjective decision making. 
The conscience is a guiding force that provides a controlling influence upon the 
individual. Such a view holds that outside messages control the conscious mind. It 
does not depend upon whether this direction is subjectively welcomed by the 
individual. This is important in the context of analysing freedom of conscience, as has 
been demonstrated in the relevant case law that shows how protection of conscience 
has been strengthened. 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan 
The Supreme Court considered freedom of religious conscience in Greater Glasgow 
Health Board v Doogan 2014.24 This case highlights an instance where equality law 
interacts with freedom of conscience. Miss Doogan and Mrs Wood were practising 
Roman Catholics who both worked at South General Hospital, Glasgow as Labour 
                                                          
19 Hudson, ‘Conscience’, 276. 
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21 Freud S., The Question of Lay Analysis (1926, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag) 
17. See further, Jones E., The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (1964, Pelican) 596; Kline P., 
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Ward Co-ordinators but objected to having any involvement in the process of abortion. 
Although this case originated in Scotland, the relevant legislation (section 217 Equality 
Act 2010) is the same in Scotland as in England and Wales. This is an indication of the 
scope of the Abortion Act 1967 and the Equality Act 2010. Section 4 Abortion Act 1967 
was considered because the Supreme Court examined the right to conscientious 
objection to abortion.  
Section 4(1) states:  
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any duty, 
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate 
in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious 
objection: Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of 
conscientious objection shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it. 
The conscience clause in s4(1) was identified as key to determining the scope of the 
right of conscientious objection,25 in particular the phrase ‘to participate in’, which 
protects an individual from participating in an abortion. As such, the question was one 
of pure statutory construction.26 
Lady Hale’s analysis followed Lord Diplock’s judgment in Royal College of Nursing of 
the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security 198127 in deciding that 
the Abortion Act 1967 authorised the whole course of treatment bringing about the 
abortion.28 Lady Hale agreed with Lord Diplock’s purposive approach that the clear 
policy brought about by the wording in the Abortion Act 1967 was to, ‘broaden the 
grounds upon which an abortion might lawfully be obtained and to ensure that abortion 
was carried out with all proper skill and in hygienic conditions.’29 The point for impact 
on freedom of conscience and equality law is that Lady Hale’s statutory construction 
then built upon this by adopting a narrow meaning in relation to participating in the 
course of treatment, for the purposes of the conscience clause under s4 Abortion Act 
1967.30 This was because, in drafting the conscience clause, it was unlikely that, 
‘Parliament had in mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks’.31 
Here Lady Hale ascribed a narrow meaning for the purposes of conscientious 
                                                          
25 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [10]-[11] per Lady Hale. 
26 Ibid. 
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objection. As an example, it was held that participation ‘means taking part in a “hands-
on” capacity.’32 Lady Hale interpreted the intention of Parliament to authorise the whole 
course of treatment in a narrow way that excluded from the conscience clause 
ancillary, administrative and supervisory tasks.  
By holding this narrow meaning, these arguments then led to the statutory 
interpretation being applied to a number of hypothetical scenarios. Here Lady Hale 
practically applied the Abortion Act 1967 to the context of particular roles and situations 
faced in the workplace by midwives.33 An example of this is Lady Hale applied the 
conscience clause to the job description of the Labour Ward Co-ordinator,34 in order to 
decide whether the particular examples satisfied her interpretation of the statutory 
wording. This found the conscience clause to be narrower than the scope put forward 
by the midwives. The whole course of treatment included work activity not included in 
the narrow conscience clause.35 As such, the nurses’ complete job description was not 
covered by the conscience clause; the nurses were required to perform services that 
infringed their religious conscience but which were not covered by the statutory 
conscience clause. 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion in relation to equality law was raised in 
the judgment.36 In deciding that the case concerned solely statutory construction, Lady 
Hale considered (and dismissed) important arguments that involve freedom of religion 
and equality law.37 Lady Hale considered that any argument made under the Equality 
Act 2010 should be made under a different forum. Doogan was held to resolve issues 
involving statutory interpretation; Doogan was not the correct setting to resolve matters 
of indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. 
The second argument alluded to by the Supreme Court questioned whether there was 
a need to apply a proportionality test to decide about limiting manifestation of belief 
following Eweida and Others v United Kingdom 2013.38 This is important because 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 
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although the case was not explicitly analysed in these terms, the fact that Lady Hale 
cites Eweida and suggests ‘refusing for religious reasons to perform some of the duties 
of the job is likely…to be held to be a manifestation of a religious belief’39 frames the 
rest of the debate in Doogan. The manifestation of belief under Article 9(1) ECHR was 
here considered to be the nurses’ conscious objection to performing services directly 
connected to abortions40 and this invoked mention about indirect discrimination under 
the Equality Act 2010.41 A judgment surrounding the issue of discrimination under 
equality law was not given. Lady Hale considered this to involve ‘difficult questions’42 
because this would involve proportionality analysis under Article 9(2) and so invoke 
whether restrictions placed upon the manifestation by the employers was a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.43 This was held not to be helpful 
because the answers would not assist in the preferred approach (statutory analysis) 
adopted by Lady Hale.44 The answers would not necessarily point to ‘either a wide or 
a narrow reading of section 4 of the 1967 Act.’45 For this reason the answers were 
deemed ‘context specific’.46 Instead, Lady Hale found it helpful to set a clear limit set 
down from the employer to the employee and instead clearly adopted the ‘ordinary 
principles of statutory construction.’47 This was because this would ‘set a limit to what 
an employer may lawfully require of his employees.’48 I suggest that in this respect the 
opinion was admirable because taking this approach helpfully provides clear guidance 
involving conscience exemptions to both hospitals and midwives. As a result of the 
case there are clearer guidelines given for the scope of conscientious objection under 
the Abortion Act 1967. 
By considering manifestation of religion in Doogan, it is clear that Lady Hale rejected 
balancing the need to provide abortion services with midwives’ religious conscience. It 
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is nevertheless clear that balancing the interests of society with those of religious 
individuals, involves weighing (and potentially restricting) rights. For example in 
Doogan, the Supreme Court considered that refusal to perform abortion services for 
religious reasons was likely to be held to be a manifestation of belief,49 and for the 
reasons given above rejected the need to employ the proportionality analysis to 
question whether the restriction of a religious right was a proportionate means of 
achieving the legitimate aim to provide hospital services in accordance with Article 
9(2).50 The need for a clear limit providing guidance for conscientious objection, in the 
provision of abortion services, was met. There was not, however, an answer given for 
the restriction upon manifestation of belief. 
On the other hand, it is submitted that the statutory construction approach by the 
Supreme Court (providing guidance) potentially decides the question in an illogical 
manner. Just because arguably a valid legal test does not help the preferred mode of 
legal analysis, this does not mean that this test should be abandoned. The 
proportionality analysis was a perfectly valid option open to the Supreme Court. A 
preferable approach is that when the Supreme Court is invited to interpret a rule 
affecting a fundamental right, they should do so against the background of the 
underlying balance of principles. In other words, to properly interpret s4(1) Abortion 
Act 1967 requires the court to consider what limitations of freedom of conscience are 
justified. The underlying balance of principles was the same and equally relevant both 
in the statutory interpretation rule and any other question of indirect discrimination. As 
such, following the use of the proportionality analysis in Eweida,51 proportionality under 
Article 9(2) ECHR was highly relevant and would have addressed the issue of 
manifestation of individual conscience and belief here. Richard Ekins, for instance, has 
termed it ‘extraordinary’ that that the Supreme Court did not reflect on Article 9 
ECHR.52 Therefore the Supreme Court should not dispense with a valid legal option 
merely because an easier option (in the form of statutory interpretation/construction) 
presents itself. It is arguable that if the Supreme Court had considered what limitations 
of freedom of conscience are justified, then the decision may have been more 
favourable to the nurses’ conscience. There was a missed opportunity to invoke the 
proportionality analysis under Article 9(2) ECHR and so a corresponding opportunity 
                                                          
49 Ibid [23]. 
50 Kentridge, ‘Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Anor [2014] UKSC 
68’. 
51 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom [2013] (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 
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to (potentially) allow for more protection to be given to individual conscience. It was a 
missed opportunity to strengthen manifestation for individual conscience. 
Alastair Henderson argues that the ruling in Doogan clarifies that the law requires 
employers to respect the conscience of their employees, to the extent that they do not 
need to directly participate in abortion.53 He identifies that this is a narrow victory for 
freedom of conscience – it is one that recognises a limited respect for freedom of 
conscience. Such a level of respect is welcome in hospitals. As Henderson points out 
this is also for the sake of women undergoing an abortion procedure, because they 
may rather not be treated by someone who strongly disagrees with what is 
happening.54 The problem with the decision in Doogan, however, is that there was an 
opportunity for strengthening freedom of conscience and this was missed: the 
proportionality of the restriction on the manifestation of the midwives’ beliefs was not 
debated. This suggests that rather than respecting conscience, Doogan was a missed 
opportunity. The Supreme Court instead ‘undercut the provision that Parliament made 
to protect conscience.’55 The missed opportunity here to protect manifestation of 
conscience highlights a limitation placed upon freedom of conscience. This now 
requires attention to be given to a later case - Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd 
2018.56  
Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd 
In Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd 201857 the right of a bakery and its owners to 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 ECHR were 
considered.58 Ashers Baking Company Ltd in Northern Ireland refused to supply a cake 
iced with the message ‘support gay marriage’ for Mr Lee. The bakers informed Mr Lee 
that his order could not be fulfilled and Mr Lee was given an apology and full refund.59 
The reason given for the refusal was that the message was not endorsed by the bakery 
owners.60 The question arose as to whether this was unlawful associative direct 
discrimination.61  
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Lady Hale recognised that there were very important questions raised by this appeal 
which were ‘undoubtedly of general public importance, not only in Northern Ireland but 
also in the rest of the United Kingdom.’62 The Court of Appeal had found that the refusal 
to bake the cake was direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation contrary to 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006. The 
provision of services here raises issues at the heart of equality law.63 
This is a contentious decision because it was a unanimous decision given by five 
justices. There were no dissenting opinions given in the Supreme Court sitting for the 
first time in Northern Ireland. The court found that the bakery could not refuse to 
provide a cake to Mr Lee because he was gay or because he supported gay 
marriage.64 This would be a form of discrimination. As such, it is clear that this is not a 
case based on sexual orientation.65 The law surrounding direct discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation was not changed. 
It is also to be considered a contentious decision because, in Lady Hale’s view, the 
bakery would be entitled to refuse to do whatever the message conveyed by the icing 
on the cake.66 Whether the message was support for a political party or support for a 
particular religious denomination, in Lady Hale’s view the bakery would be permitted 
not to provide such a service.67 Lady Hale is clear that the ‘objection was to the 
message and not to any particular person or persons.’68 In an opinion supported by 
Peter Tatchell,69 Lady Hale evidently found this not to be a case centred upon 
discrimination. The bakery would be entitled to refuse to provide a variety of messages. 
                                                          
62 Ibid [7]. 
63 See further cases relating to the provision of services - Islington v Ladele [2008] UKEAT 
0453_08_1912; Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; Lautsi v Italy 
(2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 42; McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880; Eweida v 
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[2013] UKSC 73; R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77. 
64 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 [55] per Lady Hale. 
65 The court did not reference the leading case of Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 in which direct 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation was found in the refusal to offer a 
homosexual couple a double room in a hotel. The Appellants had argued there was no direct 
discrimination and that even if their treatment of guests amounted to indirect discrimination, 
this was justified on the basis of their religion. It was held that if direct discrimination was not 
found then all the justices agreed that the refusal to provide services was indirectly 
discriminatory and unjustified. 
66 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 [55] per Lady Hale. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid [34] per Lady Hale. 
69 Tatchell P., ‘I’ve changed my mind on the gay cake row. Here’s why.’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/01/gay-cake-row-i-changed-my-mind-
ashers-bakery-freedom-of-conscience-religion 30 October 2018. 




Had the case not found for freedom of conscience, Lady Hale concedes that this would 
oblige the bakery, ‘to supply a cake iced with a message with which they profoundly 
disagreed.’70 No obligation was imposed to provide a service with a message that 
conflicted with the baker’s beliefs. Obliging a person to manifest a belief which they do 
not hold is a limitation on article 9(1) rights to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.71 As such, by upholding freedom of conscience, the level of freedom put 
forward may give more credit and substance to the role of conscience. It strengthens 
individual (and collective) conscience by not requiring individuals to act against 
protected conscience.  
Some discussion is given by Lady Hale to Article 9: ‘the Convention rights to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion … are clearly engaged by this case.’72 The case 
has ramifications for freedom of conscience. The case found freedom of conscience 
to be broader than the scope put forward by Mr Lee. Article 9 entails the courts paying 
‘respect to individual’s…religious principles’73 and so finding for the appellants under 
Article 9 by not requiring them to endorse the iced message, this case develops the 
law surrounding freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
Further focus was given by Lady Hale to Article 9 in relation to Article 10 (Freedom of 
Expression). Lady Hale makes clear under Article 9 that ‘one is free both to believe 
and not to believe.’74 This is also developed by the fact that the ‘freedom not to be 
obligated to hold or to manifest beliefs that one does not hold is also protected by 
Article 10 of the Convention.’75 This develops the interconnected position between 
Article 9 and Article 10 and goes some way to explaining the position taken by Lady 
Hale. It is evident that discussion surrounding freedom of conscience is here given 
alongside freedom of expression.76 As highlighted above Lady Hale is clear that the 
‘objection was to the message and not to any particular person or persons.’77 Freedom 
of expression holds that one must not be required to provide a service that conflicts 
with their conscience. The bakery were free not to express the iced message on the 
cake. 
                                                          
70 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 [55] per Lady Hale. 
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Force v Laramore [2017] 1 WLR 2752. See Pearson M., ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: 
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72 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 [49] per Lady Hale. 
73 Munby J., ‘Law, Morality and Religion in the Family Courts’ (2014) Ecc. L.J. 131, at 137. 
74 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 [49] per Lady Hale. 
75 Ibid [52].  
76 In a U.S. context see Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colarado Civil Rights Commission 
(2018) U.S. 584. 
77 Ibid [34]. 




By engaging freedom of conscience it is clear that Ashers may have righted the earlier 
wrong put forward in Doogan. Whereas in Doogan the limitation imposed upon 
individual conscience was not measured proportionately, in Ashers freedom of 
conscience was promoted and protected by allowing individuals not to act against their 
conscience. Freedom of conscience is strengthened – individuals are not required to 
provide services that require them to turn against their legally protected conscience. 
Conclusion 
The earlier missed opportunity to strengthen freedom of conscience in Doogan was 
taken by Lady Hale in Ashers. Ashers does not insert a conscience clause into 
equalities legislation,78 but it does develop arguments made for freedom of conscience 
and by doing so it significantly strengthens the right to freedom of conscience. 
 
                                                          
78 Such as that discussed earlier for conscientious objectors under the Abortion Act 1967. 
